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Abstract: Numerous informal logi-
cians and argumentation theorists 
restrict their theorizing to what they 
call “real” arguments. But is there a 
clear distinction to be made between 
“real” and “non-real” arguments? 
Here I explore four possible accounts 
of the alleged distinction and argue 
that none can serve the theoretical 
uses to which the distinction is most 
often put.  
 
 
 
 
Résumé: Plusieurs logiciens non 
formels et théoriciens de l’argument-
ation limitent leur construction de 
théories à ce qu’ils appellent des 
arguments « authentiques ». Mais y-a-
t’il une distinction claire entre des 
arguments« authentiques » et « inau-
thentiques » ? Ici j’explore quatre 
descriptions possibles de cette préten-
due distinction et je soutiens qu’-
aucune ne répond aux besoins théori-
ques auxquels elles sont censées ré-
pondre.  
 
Keywords: argument, actual, contrived, counterexample, everyday, genuine, 
hypothetical, informal logic, natural, specialized. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Informal logic has a predilection for focusing on “real” arguments. 
For example, Leo Groarke writes, “In keeping with the emphasis 
on real argument, I will discuss musical argument in the context of 
examples of actual argument” (Groarke 2003a, p. 419). David 
Hitchcock writes, “Theorizing about arguments often suffers from 
a lack of attention to actual arguments” (Hitchcock 1998, p. 15). In 
some cases, the very nature of informal logic is tied up with this 
focus. For example, in early writings on the subject, Ralph Johnson 
and Anthony Blair characterize informal logic in part as “a focus 
on the actual natural language arguments used in public discourse, 
clothed in their native ambiguity, vagueness and incompleteness” 
(Blair and Johnson 1980, p. x). Trudy Govier writes: “What is 
strange is that in view of these substantial gaps between real 
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arguments and the subject matter of formal logic, formal logic is 
still widely regarded as having something to offer to the non-
specialist” (Govier 1987, p. 2) and “To speak of informal logic is 
not to contradict oneself but to acknowledge what should be 
obvious: that the understanding of natural arguments requires 
substantive knowledge and insight not captured in the rules of 
axiomatized systems” (Govier 1987, p. 204). In other words, real or 
natural arguments are not the subject matter of formal logic, but 
rather what Govier calls “practical logic”. Ralph Johnson, for 
example, takes these passages from Govier as grounds for 
attributing to her the view that “informal logic is the logic of real 
arguments” (Johnson 1999, p. 268 [see also 2000, p. 121]). Finally, 
Johnson puts one of the vices of “formal logic” as “the virtual 
disappearance from the mandate of logic of the focus on real 
arguments” (Johnson 2000, p. 105). 
 I am not an informal logician—though admittedly, I am not 
sure what it would take to be one. I am, however, very interested in 
understanding the nature of arguments and in producing a general 
theory of arguments. So my question here is—does the notion of 
“real” argument have any place in a general theory of argument? 
Put another way, is the concept of a “real” argument a theoretically 
significant one? To answer this question it is necessary to try to 
understand what “real” arguments are.  
 In section 2, I examine four possibilities for what a “real” 
argument is—a genuine argument, an actual argument, an everyday 
argument, or a natural argument. I argue that each possibility faces 
difficulties. In section 3, I discuss the theoretical uses to which the 
notion of “real” argument is put and argue that none of the four 
candidates can serve these purposes. I conclude that the concept of 
a “real” argument is not a theoretically significant concept. 
 
 
2. Four options for “real” argument  
 
So what is a “real” argument? According to Johnson, “How to 
characterize this realm is a difficult matter. As we saw, Govier 
(1987) used various phrases to refer to it: ‘naturally occurring 
arguments,’ ‘natural argumentation,’ ‘real arguments.’ Others have 
used phrases such as ‘mundane argument’ or ‘everyday argument’” 
(Johnson 2000, p. 92). Yet more phrases I would add to this list 
include ‘actual arguments’ (Govier 1987, p. 4; Blair and Johnson 
1980, p. 4), ‘marketplace arguments’ (Gilbert 2002, p. 22), ‘real-
life arguments’, and ‘ordinary arguments’. Given all these 
possibilities and given differences amongst theorists in the use of 
these phrases, I shall, for the sake of clarity and brevity, focus on 
four possible distinctions that one might be trying to demarcate by 
appeal to “real” arguments, viz., genuine versus non-genuine, 
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actual versus hypothetical, everyday versus specialized, and natural 
versus contrived.  
 
 
Option 1: Real arguments are genuine arguments as opposed to 
non-genuine arguments. 
 
Just as genuine diamonds are diamonds and non-genuine diamonds 
are not, genuine arguments are arguments and non-genuine 
arguments are not arguments at all. The distinction between 
genuine and non-genuine arguments is clearly theoretically 
significant. The distinction shows up in numerous debates in 
argumentation theory. For example, debate has raged over whether 
texts without a dialectical tier component are not genuine 
arguments (Groarke 2002; Hitchcock 2002; Johnson 2002; Tindale 
2002). Also, the debates about whether works of art or music can 
be arguments (Groarke 2003b; Johnson 2003) or whether the 
performance of a judo flip can be an argument (Gilbert 2003) are 
attempts to distinguish genuine from non-genuine arguments. 
 Argumentation theorists may not stop at just genuine versus 
non-genuine, for it may turn out that some of the non-genuine 
arguments are similar enough to bona fide arguments that care must 
be taken to distinguish the genuine ones from the pseudo ones. We 
might even call particular uses of the pseudo arguments, i.e., ones 
used deliberately to deceive someone into thinking an argument has 
been presented when in fact it has not, fake arguments. Appeal to 
pseudo arguments and fake arguments would be theoretically 
relevant to argumentation theory as part of demarking genuine 
arguments from non-genuine arguments. 
 Given the genuine/non-genuine distinction, the focus on “real” 
arguments is just an insistence that a correct argument theory 
should be a theory of arguments and not include non-arguments in 
the mix. In other words, previous theorists are wrong about what 
arguments are and we need, instead, to focus on “real”, i.e., 
genuine arguments.  
 Though clearly theoretically useful, the distinction between 
genuine and non-genuine or between genuine and pseudo 
arguments is not, I strongly suspect, the distinction informal 
logicians are trying capture by the notion of “real” arguments. For 
example, Govier gives the following example from Copi: “Any 
author is successful if and only if he is well read. All authors are 
intellectuals. Some authors are successful but not well read. 
Therefore all intellectuals are authors” (Govier 1987, p. 4) as the 
sort of thing that is not a real argument. Granted, it may be stilted 
and not a normal sort of expression we expect to come across in 
our everyday lives, but one would be hard pressed to argue that the 
sentences do not express at least the core of an argument. After all, 
    G. C. Goduu 4 
the sentence ‘For all numbers n, if n is even and n is prime, then n 
is both divisible by and equal to 2’ may be stilted and not the 
normal sort of expression we expect to come across, even in 
standard mathematical situations, but it is still a sentence.  
 Clearly the genuine versus non-genuine argument distinction is 
theoretically significant. Equally clearly, the distinction is a 
significant source of disagreement and debate such that if the 
real/unreal distinction is the genuine/non-genuine distinction, then 
resolving the matter will be far beyond what can be accomplished 
in a single short paper. Hence, for the remainder of this paper I 
shall assume that the issue is whether, within the class of genuine 
arguments, there is a theoretically significant distinction to be made 
between the “real” genuine arguments and the “non-real” genuine 
arguments. 
 
 
Option 2: Real arguments are everyday arguments as opposed to 
specialized arguments.  
 
For example, Johnson and Blair write: “By informal logic we mean 
to designate a branch of logic which is concerned to develop non-
formal standards … for the analysis … of argumentation in 
everyday discourse” (Johnson and Blair 1987, p. 147). That there is 
a rough and ready distinction to be made between everyday and 
specialized arguments cannot be denied—one can easily begin by 
suggesting that the former occur quite often in debates about which 
movie to go see, letters to the editor, or on talk shows, etc., whereas 
the latter are to be found in the books and journals of the various 
specialized academic disciplines. That the rough distinction is 
theoretically useful, however, is far from obvious.  
 Firstly, argumentation theorists/informal logicians hardly 
restrict themselves to the “everyday” side of the rough 
everyday/specialized divide. For example, Johnson, in Manifest 
Rationality, points out that “real arguments, such as is the focal 
point of the theory developed in this book, complete with their core 
and dialectical trappings, will appear too erudite, too talky, or too 
rational to make an appearance on Oprah” (Johnson 2000, p. 18). 
Also, in The logic of real arguments, Alec Fisher asserts that the 
“focus of interest is not so much on everyday reasoning as on 
theoretical argument” (Fisher 1988, p. vii).  
 Secondly, the rough and ready “distinction” between everyday 
and specialized arguments is more likely to be a continuum of 
cases rather than a neat partitioning. But if arguments are more 
everyday or less everyday, more specialized or less specialized, 
then, unless we want to talk of more real and less real arguments, 
we cannot use the everyday/specialized continuum to demarcate the 
class of “real” arguments. Certainly, a similar point has been made 
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about another version of the everyday/specialized distinction—
what is often called the practical/theoretical distinction.  
 According to Robert Craig, Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) 
distinguish Theory from Practice on the grounds that they 
characteristically involve different kinds of argumentation. Theory 
employs formal arguments in which particular conclusions are 
deduced logically from universal principles. Practice, in contrast, 
employs informal or practical arguments which “involve a wider 
range of factors than formal deductions and are read with an eye to 
their occasion of use” (Craig1996, p. 461). Perhaps then real 
arguments are the arguments of practice. Consider that Govier’s 
preferred term in her Problems in Argument Analysis and 
Evaluation is “practical logic”. But as Craig points out, Jonsen and 
Toulmin acknowledge that Theory and Practice are ideal types that 
mark the extreme ends of a continuum (Clark 1996, p. 462). Clark 
goes on to argue that, “Theory is essentially involved in the highly 
informal argumentative discourses of everyday life, no less than 
Practice is essentially involved in the most rigorously, formal, 
scientific disciplines” (Clark 1996, p. 463). 
 
 
Option 3: Real arguments are actual arguments as opposed to 
hypothetical arguments.  
 
According to C.L. Hamblin, “ ‘If P, then Q’ is not a real argument 
at all, but only a hypothetical argument. It says that a certain 
hypothetical statement P, which I am not now making, would 
serve, if I were to invoke it, as a premises for a possible conclusion 
Q; but the argument remains hypothetical because I do not, or not 
necessarily, now argue this way. A real argument has real premises 
and conclusion, not hypothetical ones” (Hamblin 1970, p. 233). 
Ralph Johnson writes of Hamblin’s work that “he stressed the 
importance of dealing with real arguments as opposed to imagined 
or hypothetical or artificially constructed ones” (Johnson 2000, p. 
101). 
 If the distinction between actual and hypothetical arguments is 
to serve as the grounds for demarcating the class of “real” 
arguments, then we need to know what the difference between 
actual and hypothetical arguments is. Unfortunately, there are 
several possibilities and little agreement. Firstly, one might hold 
that actual arguments are arguments with premises that have been 
actually asserted rather than merely supposed “for the sake of 
argument”. But several informal logicians object to this restriction 
as itself unwarranted. For example, Fisher writes: 
 
Arguments employing suppositions are common enough 
in theoretical contexts—in mathematics, in the physical 
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sciences, the biological sciences, social studies and 
philosophy—… so we must explain carefully how to 
handle suppositions in argument analysis if we are not to 
leave a serious gap (Fisher 1988, p. 83; see also Walton 
1996, pp. 11-15).  
 
In addition, this restriction would seemingly remove any reductio 
ad absurdum or arguments for the induction clause in a 
mathematical induction from the realm of interest—yet such 
arguments have clearly been of interest to informal logicians. 
 Secondly, one might hold that actual arguments are arguments 
that have actually been made as opposed to ones that merely could 
be made (see Fohr 1980, p. 6). On this account the reductios that 
have been made are actual arguments and so in the realm of 
interest. Unfortunately, this attempt at actual arguments excludes 
all those arguments that have been used merely as examples to 
establish a particular point. For example, Govier uses the following 
as a counterexample to the claim that all arguments are 
explanations: “(1) Jones is a Liberal. (2) Jones is fat. (3) Jones is a 
bachelor. Therefore, (4) Jones is a fat, Liberal bachelor. Therefore, 
(5) There are fat Liberal bachelors” (Govier 1987, p. 164) and 
Walton uses the following as a counterexample to Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst’s proposal for distinguishing linked from 
convergent arguments: “Bob likes red a lot. Linda thought she saw 
Bob, and it looked like he was wearing a red tie. Therefore, Bob is 
wearing a red tie” (Walton 1996, p. 136). Neither Govier nor 
Walton actually argue for the conclusions of these arguments—the 
arguments are merely used as counterexamples. But if the 
definition of actual arguments is expanded to include these uses of 
examples to illustrate the truth or falsity of certain theoretical 
claims about arguments, then surely the definition will let in those 
very arguments that Govier and Johnson and Blair were seeking to 
exclude, viz., “series of statements constructed by logicians to 
illustrate their principles and techniques” (Govier 1987, p. 4) and 
“those which are invented just in order to serve as examples” (Blair 
and Johnson 1980, p. 27 n. 20).  
 Even without a clear notion of what a hypothetical argument 
is, from the perspective of producing an adequate theory of 
argument, we should be very wary of excluding non-actual 
arguments, for we will sometimes appeal to non-actual arguments 
in our explanations. For example, one might consider a whole set 
of possible arguments for a position one wants to advocate, but 
advance and defend only two or three of them. Assuming that no 
one has ever advanced the remaining arguments in the set, they are 
not actual, at least in the sense that they have never been (and, we 
might suppose, never will be) offered to change an audience’s 
attitudes concerning the position. But we might ask why the left-
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overs were rejected and presumably the answer might be that they 
are clearly bad arguments and would have failed if offered. 
 Consider also that our theory of natural phenomena needs to 
cover not only the actual instances, but the purely possible 
instances as well. Even if all salt were suddenly to vanish from the 
universe (which would be quite disastrous for us), our physical 
theory still needs to be able to say what would happen if a 
hypothetical batch of salt were to be placed in a cup of water. 
Similarly we want an adequate theory of arguments to be able to 
say what would (or would likely) happen if hypothetical argument 
X were advanced in hypothetical situation S to hypothetical 
audience A. 
 
 
Option 4: Real arguments are natural arguments as opposed to 
contrived arguments. 
 
For example, according to Fisher the objects of concern are “real 
arguments—not the ‘made-up’ kind with which logicians usually 
deal. They originate from various sources ranging from classic 
texts to newspapers” (Fisher 1988, p. 15). According to Govier,  
 
an actual argument is simply an argument, a piece of 
discourse or writing in which someone tries to convince 
others (or himself) of the truth of a claim by citing reasons 
on its behalf. I speak of actual arguments because I do not 
wish to speak of the contrived arguments—series of 
statements constructed by logicians to illustrate their 
principles and techniques (Govier 1987, p. 4). 
 
In one sense all arguments are contrived—the real question is 
for what purpose are they contrived. Some are contrived as 
attempts to convince some audience of something. Some are 
contrived as exemplifications of particular general forms or 
patterns of reasoning—either valid or fallacious. Some are 
contrived as counterexamples to particular parts of various theories 
of arguments. Some are contrived as exercises for logic 
textbooks—symbolic, informal, etc. 
Presumably it is the first use that is meant as the primary use of 
natural arguments—arguments constructed to convince, persuade, 
or change the acceptance level of, some audience of something. But 
consider that arguments that may at one time have been contrived 
for the purpose of convincing an audience may now be used solely 
as examples or counterexamples; whereas arguments that may have 
been originally contrived as examples may actually be used to 
argue for a given position. If the class of natural arguments is 
composed of those arguments contrived for the purpose of 
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convincing, then the former would be natural arguments despite 
their ‘quaint’ appearance now and the latter contrived arguments 
despite their current usage. If natural arguments are defined as 
those arguments that have ever been used to convince, then the 
natural/contrived distinction just becomes a variant of the 
actual/hypothetical distinction already discussed.  
Perhaps the difficulty can be avoided by defining the natural 
arguments as those that could reasonably be used to convince an 
audience of something. The problem now is to specify what counts 
as “reasonably used” in such a way that the sorts of arguments that 
Govier, and Johnson and Blair, and others rail against will in fact 
be excluded. This problem is especially acute if one can find 
examples of especially bad or especially artificial sounding cases 
that have been actually used to argue a point, for then a strong case 
can be made that lots of other arguments like them could also be so 
used. Indeed, the case of especially bad arguments poses a special 
problem since any adequate theory of arguments will, regardless of 
whether the bad argument could ever be plausibly used to argue 
with or not, need to be able to account for the badness of the 
argument. After all, the “obvious” badness of the argument will 
explain the lack of plausible use rather than the other way around.  
Next I turn to an examination of the possible theoretical uses 
of the “real” arguments demarcation, but first two points. Firstly, 
combinations of these options exist in the literature. For example, 
Blair and Johnson (1980), who lead the charge to focus on “real” 
arguments, describe natural arguments as “arguments that have 
actually been used to try to persuade people, the sorts of arguments 
the student will encounter outside the classroom” (Blair and 
Johnson 1980, p. 13) and part of “actual, everyday persuasive 
discourse” (Blair and Johnson 1980, p. 14). In addition, they write:  
 
We need a term to refer … to arguments actually used in a 
first-order way to attempt to convince—and moreover 
used without self-consciousness about the ‘nature’ or 
‘structure’ of some ideal argument. The term ‘natural 
arguments’ will then distinguish such arguments from 
those which are invented just in order to serve as 
examples, and also (for the most part) from those which 
are self-consciously framed according to an explicit model 
of argument (such as arguments with numbered premises 
sometimes found in philosophy journal articles) (Blair and 
Johnson 1980, p. 27 n. 20). 
  
Here we can see elements of all three of the previous distinctions: 
actually used to convince, not invented just to serve as examples, 
found in everyday sources outside the classroom. On this account 
real arguments just are arguments that are neither contrived nor 
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theoretical nor hypothetical. Put another way, real arguments would 
then just be actual, everyday natural arguments. Unfortunately, this 
proposal, along with any other combinatorial proposal, will just 
inherit the defects of each individual option. 
 Secondly, perhaps there is some distinction other than the four 
(and their variants) that I have considered here, that is what 
informal logicians are trying to capture under the concept “real” 
arguments. If so, I have not found an expression of it in the 
literature. Additionally, I see no plausible candidate over and above 
the four already considered. Hence, short of a plausible new 
alternative being offered, I take these four possibilities as 
exhausting the options for what is intended by “real” versus “non-
real” argument. Since each has been found wanting, the prospects 
for a theoretically useful class of “real” arguments appear dim. 
Regardless, I turn now to considering whether any of these four 
distinctions could ground the appeal to a class of “real” arguments. 
 
 
3. Theoretical uses of “real” arguments?  
 
There seem to be three primary uses of the appeal to “real” 
arguments: (i) to demarcate the subject matter of informal logic 
(often as opposed to the subject matter of formal logic); (ii) to 
defend one’s own theory against counterexamples; and (iii) to show 
the inadequacy of either formal logic or formal deductive logic as 
theories of argument. 
 None of the distinctions discussed in the previous section will 
support use (i). Anyone interested in arguments is interested in 
genuine arguments, whether he or she is an informal logician or 
not. Informal logicians certainly do not have a monopoly on 
genuine arguments and do not agree amongst themselves what 
counts as a genuine argument. Hence, genuine arguments cannot 
demarcate the subject matter of informal logic. As we have already 
seen, different theorists focus on different parts of the 
everyday/theoretical continuum, so everyday arguments cannot 
demarcate the subject matter of informal logic. The 
actual/hypothetical distinction suffers from both defects—there is 
no agreement amongst theorists on where to draw the line and 
theorists take as their area of study both actual and hypothetical 
arguments. Finally, the distinction between natural and contrived 
arguments ultimately seems to depend on the use to which an 
argument is put—natural arguments are the ones for which the 
conclusion is actually or could be actually argued. But as many 
theorists have suggested, arguments have many legitimate uses, one 
of which may be convincing/persuading/changing the attitude of an 
audience of/toward the conclusion. But the debate over the various 
uses of arguments cannot even be a debate within informal logic if 
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the subject matter of informal logic is demarcated by appeal to 
arguments used in one particular way. In addition, as we saw in the 
case of actual and natural arguments above, many informal 
logicians use so-called “contrived” cases for valid theoretical 
purposes and so if we restrict informal logic to natural arguments, 
then these theoretical purposes will not be served. 
 Indeed, one of the uses the appeal to real arguments is 
sometimes put is to defend one’s own theory against 
counterexamples. For example, Robert Yanal, in defense of his 
theory of how to distinguish linked from convergent arguments, 
claims that purported counterexamples such as “It is raining. The 
wind is blowing. So, either Rembrandt painted The Polish Rider or 
Rembrandt did not paint The Polish Rider” (Yanal 1991, p. 142) 
are not necessarily arguments on the grounds that they are not 
arguments in the “informal logic or ordinary language sense of 
argument”, i.e., they are not “the giving of evidence for something 
of the presenting of reasons to believe something” (Yanal 1991, p. 
143). 
 Yanal’s rejection of proposed counterexamples is legitimate if 
the distinction he is appealing to is the genuine/non-genuine 
distinction. Putting forward a non-genuine argument as a 
counterexample to a theoretical principle meant to cover arguments 
is obviously a non-starter. The success of such a defense, however, 
depends upon having a generally agreed upon account of genuine 
arguments, which we do not have. But given that Yanal is 
appealing to the informal logic sense of argument, perhaps Yanal 
means to claim that while the counterexample is a genuine 
argument it is not a “real” argument and the linked/convergent 
distinction is only meant to apply to “real” arguments. The success 
of this strategy also depends on a clear and theoretically sound 
distinction between “real” and “non-real” arguments, which we 
again do not have.1  
 In addition, as we have seen, restricting ourselves to cases of 
the giving of evidence or the presenting of reasons removes our 
ability to explain why someone who actually argued with argument 
A passed up arguments B, C, and D. More generally, given no clear 
demarcation of “real” arguments, defending one’s theory by 
claiming it is just a theory of “real” arguments runs dangerously 
                                                 
1 In fact, in this particular case, since Yanal’s linked/convergent 
distinction is ultimately based on relationships amongst the various 
conditional probabilities of the conclusion given the premises 
individually and as groups, it is hard to see how these relationships can 
legitimately be expected to be well-behaved only in, and so restricted to, 
cases in which the premises constitute the giving of evidence or the 
presenting of reasons to believe something. (Elsewhere, (Goddu, 2003), I 
have shown that the relationships are not even well-behaved for Yanal’s 
canonical cases.) 
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close to committing the very sin that I suspect motivated, at least in 
part, the distinction in the first place—namely, tailoring the 
arguments to the theory rather than the theory to the arguments. 
After all, one could always reject a proposed counterexample by 
saying one’s theory was not designed to accommodate that type of 
argument, with the net result being that the type of arguments that 
the theorist accepts as legitimate are just those that accord with the 
theory. 
 Finally, what of appealing to the distinction to argue that 
formal logic is inadequate as a significant part of a theory of 
argument, presumably on the grounds that formal logic cannot 
adequately deal with “real” arguments? One would be hard pressed 
to argue that there are no everyday, non-contrived, actual 
arguments such that “formal” logic (whatever that is) has no 
significant role in analyzing or evaluating them. For example, 
consider the following brief exchange: 
 
Arthur: “Either we keep the money or we have to figure 
out how to return it.”  
Sam: “Keeping it is not an option.”  
Arthur: “So, we have to figure out how to return it.” 
 
At the very least, the acceptability of Arthur’s reasoning is 
demonstrable via so-called “formal” methods. But if the claim is 
not that there are no everyday, non-contrived, actual arguments that 
formal logic has something useful to say about, but merely that 
there are at least some such arguments, then no special class of 
“real” arguments is required to show the inadequacy of formal 
logic. More specifically, if only some “real” arguments constitute 
counterexamples to the adequacy of formal logic, then it is the 
features shared by the subset of counterexamples that are relevant 
and not the features that allegedly demarcate arguments as “real”.  
 Perhaps the theoretical significance of “real” arguments can be 
defended by making the stronger claim that formal logic could not 
play a significant role in any adequate theory of argument because 
it cannot accommodate any “real” argument. While there certainly 
are hints of this strong thesis in the literature, I am highly skeptical 
that this thesis can be vindicated without either trivializing what is 
meant by ‘real argument’ or ‘formal logic’ or placing the bar on 
what counts as a significant role unacceptably high. For example, 
one could define ‘real argument’ to mean just those arguments that 
formal logic cannot accommodate or define ‘formal logic’ in such a 
way that (i) nothing counts as a formal logic or (ii) the only things 
that count as formal logics are things that no one has ever 
suggested would or could play the needed role. But what remains to 
be seen, and what is clearly beyond the scope of what can be 
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accomplished here, is whether any significant sense can be given to 
‘real argument’ and ‘formal logic’ that vindicates the strong claim. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Given the seemingly close association between informal logic and 
“real” arguments, one might take my repudiation of the notion of 
“real” arguments as a repudiation of informal logic itself. No such 
repudiation is intended or accomplished. If, as I have argued, there 
is no clear and theoretically useful class of “real” arguments, then 
we should not attempt to define informal logic in terms of such 
class. How we should understand informal logic is not my concern 
here, though there are plenty of alternative candidates. For 
example, in recent work David Hitchcock suggests understanding 
informal logic in terms of the sorts of questions it takes as primary 
rather than in terms of some class of arguments (Hitchcock, 2007). 
 Nor should this paper be taken as impugning the motivations 
for attempts to demarcate a class of real arguments. Hitchcock’s 
worry, quoted at the beginning of this paper, that “theorizing about 
arguments often suffers from a lack of attention to actual 
arguments” is a legitimate worry even if there is no theoretically 
significant class of “real” arguments. A theory that primarily 
appeals to trivial or overly contrived or imagined2 cases as 
exemplars of the theory (or even worse, tailors itself to fit such 
cases) runs the serious risk of being a trivial and inconsequential 
theory. Any adequate theory must be able to account for all 
legitimate cases, whether trivial or consequential or actual or 
hypothetical or everyday or specialized, etc.  
 Finally, what I have said here does not preclude the notion of a 
“real” argument having some use within informal logic. Perhaps 
appeal to “real” arguments has a legitimate pedagogical use. For 
example, appeal to the rough and ready distinctions between 
natural and contrived or everyday and specialized might ground the 
pedagogical goal of making the relevance and practical utility of 
the subject material obvious to students. Whether the notion of a 
“real” argument has any role to play within informal logic has not 
been my concern here. I have merely been arguing that the notion 
has no useful theoretical role to play in a general theory of 
argument. 
 Unless a clearer notion of “real” argument than the ones 
surveyed here is forthcoming, a general theory of argument has no 
                                                 
2 Michael Scriven and Tony Blair, in different conversations, cited the 
over-reliance on trivial (Scriven) or imagined (Blair) cases in formal 
logic (or at least formal logic as it was being presented in the standard 
textbooks) as a primary motivation for the shift to informal logic. 
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good reason to demarcate a class of “real” arguments that is a 
subset of the class of genuine arguments. On the one hand, 
assuming there are counterexamples to the adequacy of formal 
logic as part of an adequate theory of argument, no appeal to a class 
of “real” arguments seems required to identify these 
counterexamples. On the other hand, none of the primary 
candidates for “real” arguments, viz., everyday arguments or actual 
arguments or natural arguments, can support either a clearly 
demarcated subject matter for informal logic or an adequate 
defense against counterexamples to one’s preferred theory. Thus, 
instead of focusing on an alleged class of “real” arguments, I would 
recommend focusing on the theoretically significant and 
challenging problem of distinguishing those entities that are 
genuine arguments from those that are not.3 
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